BEHIND COLD WAR CURTAINS: DENMARK'S CLANDESTINE ARMS SHIPMENTS AND COVERT INTERVENTIONS

Nir  Leviatan

Nir Leviatan Research fellow at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA Center) at Bar-Ilan University

Keywords: Third-party covert interventions, Clandestine diplomacy, Iran-Contra Affair, Middle -East, Denmark

Abstract

Review paper

DOI: https://doi.org/10.37458/ssj.6.1.3

This article delves into the realm of covert diplomacy, emphasizing the often-overlooked role of third-party covert interventions in the realm of international relations. Specifically, it sheds light on Denmark's involvement in facilitating arms shipments, a role that extended beyond mere cooperation and involved concealed actions, alliance-strengthening, and clandestine settlements. The analysis highlights the unique nature of Denmark's clandestine collaborations, which involve lower initial investment costs, potentially raising concerns about reliability. It underscores how these partnerships allow for flexible, follow-up agreements that minimize conflicting obligations. While larger states possess superior capabilities in uncovering hidden events, the paper also recognizes that smaller nations can generate productive results through covert actions. Its potential to deliver strategic actions, which can lead to sudden realignments and disrupt the diplomatic and military strategies of other nations, underscores its impact on global politics. The article extends the literature on third-party covert interventions by showcasing how third parties, such as Denmark, can secure additional benefits.

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